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Abstract Insider threat detection is getting an increased concern from academia,
industry, and governments due to the growing number of malicious insider inci-
dents. The existing approaches proposed for detecting insider threats still have a
common shortcoming, which is the high number of false alarms (false positives).
The challenge in these approaches is that it is essential to detect all anomalous
behaviours which belong to a particular threat. To address this shortcoming, we
propose an opportunistic knowledge discovery system, namely AnyThreat, with
the aim to detect any anomalous behaviour in all malicious insider threats. We
design the AnyThreat system with four components. (1) A feature engineering
component, which constructs community data sets from the activity logs of a
group of users having the same role. (2) An oversampling component, where we
propose a novel oversampling technique named Artificial Minority Oversampling
and Trapper REmoval (AMOTRE). AMOTRE first removes the minority (anoma-
lous) instances that have a high resemblance with normal (majority) instances to
reduce the number of false alarms, then it synthetically oversamples the minor-
ity class by shielding the border of the majority class. (3) A class decomposition
component, which is introduced to cluster the instances of the majority class into
subclasses to weaken the effect of the majority class without information loss. (4) A
classification component, which applies a classification method on the subclasses
to achieve a better separation between the majority class(es) and the minority
class(es). AnyThreat is evaluated on synthetic data sets generated by Carnegie
Mellon University. It detects approximately 87.5% of malicious insider threats,
and achieves the minimum of false positives=3.36%.
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1 Introduction
Insider threat detection is a growing challenge for companies and governments
trying to protect their assets from malicious insider threats. An insider is a current
or former employee, contractor, or business partner of an organisation who has
authorised access to the network, system, or data [12]. A malicious insider threat
refers to a malicious insider who exploits their privileges with the intention to
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system or data [34].
The 2018 Insider Threat Report [35], released by the Crowd Research Partners,
found that 90% of the organisations feel vulnerable to insider attacks, where 53%
of the survey respondents confirmed typically less than five insider attacks against
their organisation in the past year. Furthermore, the 2018 Insider Threat Report
states that 64% of the organisations are focusing on the detection of the insider
threats followed by the prevention and post breach forensics.
The insider threat problem represents a unique knowledge discovery problem
that has been addressed either as a sequence-based problem, or as a behaviour-
based problem. The sequence-based approaches define an insider threat as a set
of behaviours (i.e. actions, commands) executed in a specific order of time by a
malicious insider. The behaviour-based approaches define an insider threat as a
set of behaviours executed by a malicious insider, regardless of the time order.
The existing approaches still have a common shortcoming when addressing the
insider threat problem, which is the high number false alarms. The challenge in
these approaches is that it is essential to detect all behaviours which belong to
a particular threat. A malicious insider threat is devised of a complex pattern of
anomalous behaviours carried out by a malicious insider, which makes it difficult
to detect all behaviours attributed to all malicious insider threats.
To overcome the shortcoming of the high number of false alarms and to address
the challenge in the existing approaches, we propose a knowledge discovery system,
namely AnyThreat, with the aim to detect any-behaviour-all-threats; it is suffi-
cient to detect any anomalous behaviour in all malicious insider threats. In other
words, we can hunt a malicious insider threat by at least detecting one anomalous
behaviour among the anomalous behaviours associated to this threat. Designing
the knowledge discovery system with such a relaxing condition will contribute in
reducing the false alarms. We call this approach opportunistic, or sometimes we
refer to it as threat hunting.
We design the knowledge discovery system AnyThreat with four components: a
feature engineering component, an oversampling component, a class decomposition
component, and a classification component. We elaborate on the contribution of
each component in the following.
– The feature engineering component preprocesses the system and network
logs of users behaviour and extracts the feature set to define the feature space
of the insider threat problem.
– With the scarcity of instances for ‘anomalous’ behaviours (attributed to ma-
licious insider threats) in an organisation and the abundance of instances for
‘normal’ behaviours, we shape the insider threat problem as an opportunistic
classification problem with class imbalance. The oversampling component
tackles the class imbalance in the insider threat data, where the minority class
consists of the rare anomalous behaviours that map to different scenarios of
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threats, and the majority class consists of the normal behaviours of a commu-
nity of users (i.e. a group of users having the same role). We devised an over-
sampling technique, namely Artificial Minority Oversampling and Trapper RE-
moval (AMOTRE), for the oversampling component. AMOTRE implements a
Trapper REmoval (-TRE) method to remove behaviours from the insider threat
data (minority class) that have high resemblance with the normal behaviour,
and can be a trapper for the classifier to generate false alarms. The removal of
such instances can be mostly safe, as based on the opportunistic approach, the
detection of all behaviours carried out by the insider is not required. AMOTRE
then synthetically oversamples the minority class by shielding the border of the
majority class. It is worth noting that the proposed AMOTRE technique can
be replaced by any other oversampling technique such as Synthetic Minority
Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) [14] and its variations, which are the most
successful in this area.
– Class decomposition is the process of using clustering over the instances of a
class or more in a data set to detect subclasses [38]. The process can be applied
to all classes or a subset of the classes present in the data. In this system, the
Class Decomposition (CD) component is used to weaken the effect of the
majority class without information loss or cluster-based sampling.
– The classification component applies a classification method to delineate
one (or multiple) decision boundaries to separate the majority instances and
the minority instances, thus improving the prediction of new instances.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a review of
the sequence-based approaches and the behaviour-based approaches proposed for
insider threat detection. In Section 3, we present the knowledge discovery system
AnyThreat, and we describe and formulate the four components. In Section 4, we
evaluate the performance of the proposed opportunistic AnyThreat system util-
ising the proposed the state-of-the-art SMOTE or the proposed AMOTRE over-
sampling technique with and without the class decomposition variations. Finally,
we conclude this article with a conclusion and future work in Section 5.
2 Related Work
There exists a significant body of research on applying data mining approaches for
detecting insider threats. In this Section, we discuss related work on the sequence-
based approaches and the behaviour-based classification approaches proposed for
insider threat detection.
2.1 Sequence-based Approaches
The sequence-based approaches define a malicious insider threat as a sequence
of behaviours executed in a specific order attributed to a malicious insider. In
the following, we provide a review of the proposed sequence-based approaches for
detecting insider threats.
A recent framework based on a graph approach and isolation Forest (iForest)
was presented by Gamachchi et al. [17] to isolate suspicious malicious insiders
from the workforce. Furthermore, Gamachchi and Boztas [16] propose a frame-
work based on attributed graph clustering and outlier ranking for insider threat
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detection. The proposed framework shares some characteristics with the author’s
framework [17], however, an outlier ranking technique named GOutRank is em-
ployed instead of iForest to detect the malicious users. Moriano et al. [32] suggest
a temporal bipartite graph of user-system interactions to detect anomalous time
intervals. Eberle and Holder [15] suggest a graph-based framework to detect mali-
cious insider threats using graph substructures. The framework employs three dif-
ferent versions of the Graph-Based Anomaly Detection (GBAD) algorithm: infor-
mation theoretic GBAD, probabilistic GBAD, and maximum partial substructure
GBAD. Huang and Stamp [24] propose Profile Hidden Markov Model (PHMM)
compared to the standard Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to detect masqueraders
(i.e. insiders who infiltrate a systems access control to overcome access to a users
account). In contrast to HMM, PHMM relies on positional observations which in-
clude a session start and a session end features. Tang et al. [37] suggest a hybrid
approach of Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) and HMM. The hybrid approach
models data over session slots and assigns an abnormality score for each user.
2.2 Behaviour-based Classification Approaches
The behaviour-based approaches defines a malicious insider threat as a set of be-
haviours (instances). An instance is defined as a feature vector (a set of features)
extracted from the activity logs of a user or a group of users. Hence, an anoma-
lous behaviour is a feature vector whose features’ values deviate from the normal
baseline. In what follows, a review of the behaviour-based classification approaches
proposed for insider threat detection is provided.
Mayhew et al. [31] describe a Behaviour-Based Access Control (BBAC) ap-
proach that analyses user behaviour at the network layer, the HTTP request layer,
and the document layer to detect behaviour changes. BBAC combines Support
Vector Machine (SVM), k-means clustering, and C4.5 decision tree to improve
scalability and reduce false positives. Punithavathani et al. [36] present an Insider
Attack Detection System (IADS) based on the supervised k-Nearest Neighbours
(k-NN) to counter insider threats in critical networks. Azaria et al. [2] present
a Behavioural Analysis of Insider Threat (BAIT) framework that contains boot-
strapping algorithms built on top of SVM or Naives Bayes classifiers. Gates et
al. [18] use the structure of the file system hierarchy to measure the level of ac-
cess similarity of the files, and detect anomalous behaviour based on a predefined
threshold. The paper defines access similarity measure techniques including, self
score which compares a user’s access similarity to a user’s historical accesses; and
a relative score which compares a user’s average score to other users’ accesses.
Axelrad et al. [1] present a Bayesian Network (BN) approach to predict insider
threats based on psychological features of malicious insiders. Barrios [4] develops
a multi-level framework, called database Intrusion Detection System (dIDS), that
employs BN to detect malicious transactions.
2.3 The Shortcoming of High Number of False Alarms
The reviewed approaches have shown merit in addressing the insider threat detec-
tion problem, however, they still have a common shortcoming which is the high
number of false alarms. Some of these approaches report a low FP rate, such as:
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Fig. 1: Workflow of the Proposed Opportunistic Knowledge Discovery System – AnyThreat.
FP rate=0.18 − 1% in BBAC [31]; FP rate=2.5% in [18]; and FP rate=4.73% in
BAIT [2]. However, these approaches are evaluated on data sets not specifically
designed for insider threats. Thus, their use does not constitute the challenges of
variety and complexity in threat scenarios.
To address this shortcoming, in this work, we propose an opportunistic knowl-
edge discovery system, namely AnyThreat, to tackle the insider threat problem. To
our knowledge, none of the existing approaches addressed the insider threat prob-
lem from the perspective of class imbalance, which was discussed in [2]. AnyThreat
implements the first class imbalance data approach for insider threat detection.
We investigate how the concept of class decomposition and the oversampling of a
selective set of anomalous instances address the class imbalance data problem and
minimise the number of false alarms, as detailed in the following Section.
3 Proposed Opportunistic Knowledge Discovery System
In this section, we present the proposed opportunistic knowledge discovery system,
namely AnyThreat, with the aim to detect any-behaviour-all-threat. It is sufficient
to detect any anomalous behaviour of all malicious insider threats in the data set.
Fig. 1 illustrates the workflow of the AnyThreat system. Given that the data of
both ‘normal’ behaviours (instances) and ‘anomalous’ behaviours (attributed to
malicious insider threats) are available in an organisation, the AnyThreat system
takes as input the community users behaviours from a data set (database). We
design the AnyThreat system with four components: a feature engineering compo-
nent, an oversampling component, a class decomposition component, and a classi-
fication component. In the following, we elaborate on the role of each component
in the system workflow.
3.1 Feature Engineering Component
The first step to tackle the insider threat problem in the AnyThreat system is
to identify the insider threat feature space. The role of the feature engineering
component is to preprocess the data set, and define and extract the feature set
to prepare the data for the data mining approach. In this work, we utilised the
r5.2 release of the synthetic data sets generated by Carnegie Mellon University -
Community Emergency Response Team (CMU-CERT) [19,13], which implements
a variety of malicious insider threat scenarios. The r5.2 CMU-CERT data sets
consist of system and network logs for the activities carried out by users in an or-
ganisation over the course of 18 months (e.g. logons, connecting removable devices,
copying files, browsing websites, sending emails, etc.). Based on the literature [8,
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29], we extract a feature set from these logs to represent the baseline of users’
behaviour. We categorise the features into five groups as follows:
– Frequency-based ‘integer’: assess the frequency of an activity carried out by the
users in a specified community during a defined period of time (e.g. frequency
of logon, frequency of connecting devices);
– Time-based ‘integer’: assess an activity carried out within the non-working
hours (e.g. logon after work hours, device usage after work hours);
– Boolean ‘flag={0, 1}’: assess the presence/absence of an activity-related in-
formation (e.g. non-empty email-bcc, a non-employee email recipient, sensitive
file extension);
– Attribute-based ‘integer’: are more specialised features which assess an activity
with respect to a particular value of an attribute (e.g. browsing a particular
URL job websites, WikiLeaks); and
– Others ‘integer’: assess the count of other activity-related information (e.g.
number of email recipients, number of attachments to emails).
Based on the identified feature set, we construct community data sets, where a
community data set represents the behaviour of a group of users having the same
role (e.g. Salesman, IT admin) over session slots. A session slot defines the period
of time from start time to end time, such that the behaviour logs of all users in the
community during this period of time are used to extract a vector of feature values
(i.e. instance). In this work, the session slot is defined per 4 hours, which is long
enough to extract an instance that provides an adequate evidence of anomalous
behaviour. If the session slot is chosen per minutes, for example, the extracted
instances would lack adequate evidence of the occurrence of anomalous behaviour.
On the other hand, if the session slot is chosen per days/weeks, for example, the
period of time will be too long to capture the anomalous behaviour blurred among
the normal behaviour in the extracted vector of feature values.
Among the 2000 employees in the r5.2 data sets, we extracted the data logs
for the users (employees) belonging to the following three community data sets to
be later utilised to validate the experiments:
– Production line worker (com-P): It consists of 300 users, including 17 malicious
insiders. It has the scenarios {s1, s2, s4} implemented;
– Salesman (com-S): It consists of 298 users, including 22 malicious insiders. It
has the scenarios {s1, s2, s4} implemented; and
– IT admin (com-I): It consists of 80 users, including 12 malicious insiders. It
has the scenarios {s2, s3} implemented.
After constructing a community data set, we normalise each vector of feature
values to the range [0, 1], and associate it with a class label {Normal,Anomalous}.
3.2 Oversampling Component
In the oversampling component, we tackle the class imbalance data problem by
sampling the instances of the minority class to modify the original distribution
of data among the classes and to achieve an approximate balance between the
majority class (or clusters of the majority class) and the minority class.
A leading and widely adopted sampling technique is a hybrid technique, called
Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) [14]. In the following, we
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introduce SMOTE as an oversampling technique that can be employed in the
oversampling component of the AnyThreat system. We then present, describe,
and formalise the proposed AMOTRE oversampling technique.
3.2.1 SMOTE Oversampling Technique
The SMOTE technique was first proposed as an oversampling technique, which in-
troduces artificial samples into the minority class, making it more dense. Let I rep-
resent the original set of instances that belong to the minority class, and perc.over
be the percentage of oversampling. For each instance At ∈ I, SMOTE finds its
kSMOTE (parameter kSMOTE) nearest neighbours from the set of minority class
instances I. Then, based on the parameter perc.over, a perc.over/100 number of
artificial samples is generated for each At. An artificial sample St for At is intro-
duced along the segment line joining At and any of its kSMOTE nearest neighbours
(randomly selected). In this way, for each At, the artificial samples will be gener-
ated along the segments joining any/all of its kSMOTE nearest neighbours. Con-
sider, for example, if perc.over = 200, then SMOTE generates perc.over/100=2
artificial samples for each At. Thus, it introduces (perc.over/100)× card(I)=2×
card(I) samples into the minority class.
Undersampling was then integrated into the SMOTE technique to remove ran-
dom samples from the majority class, so that the minority class becomes a specified
percentage of the majority class. Let perc.under represent the percentage of under-
sampling. For instance, if perc.under = 300 and the number of artificial samples
added to the minority class is 60, then only (perc.under/100)× 60=180 majority
instances are randomly selected to remain in the set of majority class instances.
The other majority instances are removed. In this way, the SMOTE technique
reverses the initial bias of the classifier towards the majority class in the favour of
the minority class.
SMOTE [14] and its variations are the most successful in this area. In the fol-
lowing, we describe and argue the suitablilty of some of the techniques proposed
as an extension for SMOTE [22,11,30,5]. For instance, Borderline-SMOTE [22]
seeks to oversample only the borderline minority instances; those which are in the
borderline areas (i.e. on or near the decision boundary), where the majority class
and the minority class overlap. This technique generates synthetic samples in the
neighbourhood of the borderline(s), where the minority instances are most likely to
be misclassified. We argue that Borderline-SMOTE is not suitable for the insider
threat problem due to the following. First, this technique assumes a well-defined
border(s) of the minority class along all the dimensions (i.e. features), which is not
applicable in the insider threat problem. The complexity of the malicious insider
threat scenarios manifests in the high similarity of the anomalous behaviours to
normal behaviours. The minority instances (i.e. anomalous behaviours) are typi-
cally similar to the majority instances (i.e. normal behaviours), however, at the
level of some features. Second, the concept of the Borderline-SMOTE disregards
the oversampling of minority instances within the minority class, and therefore
the creation of clusters for the minority class is not applicable, making the process
of class decomposition (later described in Section 3.3) less effective. Hence, in this
work, we consider the traditional SMOTE as a more suitable technique for insider
threat problem, and accordingly, we use it as a benchmark for our experimental
study, detailed later in Section 4.
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Algorithm 1 Identifying peculiarity of minority instances.
1: foreach At ∈ I do
2: compute perclof tM
3: compute perclof tI
4: if perclof tM < τ then
5: remove trapper instance At from I
6: Ir ← I \At
7: end if
8: end for
9: foreach At ∈ Ir do
10: pt =
(dperclof tM e × dperclof tIe) /104
11: p← p ∪ pt
12: end for
13: return p,Ir
3.2.2 Proposed AMOTRE Oversampling Technique
In SMOTE oversampling technique, the process of generating new instances is
solely dependent on existing instances in the minority class, or defines the border
instances to oversample based on nearest neighbours using all dimensions collec-
tively. In the following, we propose a selective oversampling technique, namely
AMOTRE, as an alternative to the state-of-the-art SMOTE sampling technique
to employ in the oversampling component of the AnyThreat system. In AMOTRE,
and for the first time, we constrain the generation of new instances when synthet-
ically oversampling the minority class by shielding the borders of the majority
class along each dimension (i.e. feature) separately in the data set, preventing the
generation of instances that may be positioned in close proximity to the instances
of the majority class that in turn increases the false alarms.
In the following, we describe the steps of the AMOTRE oversampling tech-
nique, and we later evaluate its performance in Section 4.
3.2.2.1 Identifying the Peculiarity of Minority Instances The first step in the
AMOTRE oversampling technique is to identify the peculiarity of the minority
instances. This guides the process of generating artificial samples for each minor-
ity instance At in the minority class I. Algorithm 1 gives a brief formalisation for
identifying the peculiarity of the minority instances.
LOF for Minority Instances We utilise the Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [9]
method to find the LOF for each minority instance At ∈ I. LOF is a density-
based method that calculates the local outlier factor (score) for each instance in a
data set with respect to its kLOF (parameter kLOF ) nearest neighbours from the
whole data set. For instance, consider that LOF is normalised in the range [0, 1].
If the location of an instance is in a high-density region (cluster), then the LOF is
closer to 0 (too low). However, if the instance is in a low-density region, then the
LOF is closer to 1 (too high). The advantage of LOF compared to global outlier
methods is that LOF can identify local outliers in certain regions of the data set
which would not be identified as outliers with respect to the whole data set.
We introduce two modified versions of LOF to utilise in the approach proposed
in this article: lof tM and lof
t
I . In both versions, the idea is to calculate the local
outlier factor for each minority instance At ∈ I in the training data set. lof tM and
lof tI are tuned for different values of kLOF .
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Fig. 2: loftM and lof
t
I cases of insider threat instances.
We define lof tM and lof
t
I as follows:
Definition 1 lof tM The lof
t
M is the LOF for a minority instance A
t with respect
to the kLOF nearest neighbours from the majority class instances (M) only exclud-
ing the other minority class. In lof tM , we select the value of kLOF =
√
1 + card(M)
(thumb-rule), where the radicand 1 + card(M) represents the number of instances
utilised to calculate lof tM for A
t (1 minority instance At + all of majority instances
M).
Definition 2 lof tI The lof
t
I is the LOF for a minority instance A
t with respect
to the kLOF nearest neighbours from the minority class instances (I \ At) only
excluding the majority class. In lof tI , we select the value of kLOF =
√
card(I)
(thumb-rule), where the radicand card(I) represents the number of minority in-
stances utilised to calculate lof tI for A
t (all minority instances I including At).
Note that lof tM is still calculated with respect to the whole majority class M
(i.e. all the majority instances) regardless of whether class M is decomposed into
clusters (subclasses). The reason behind this is that class decomposition only im-
proves classification (from two-class to multi-class classification) to weaken the
effect of the majority class. Similarly, lof tI is calculated with respect the the whole
minority class I (i.e. all other minority instances) regardless if class I is decom-
posed into clusters (subclasses).
In the following, we infer the degree of outlierness of a minority instance At
based on the values of both lof tM and lof
t
I in three different cases illustrated in
Figure 2:
– high lof tM (close to 1) and low lof
t
I (close to 0) ⇒ At is in a high-density
region of minority instances away from the majority instances.
– high lof tM (close to 1) and high lof
t
I (close to 1) ⇒ At is in an outlier away
from the majority and minority instances. We call At here an extreme outlier
instance.
– low lof tM (close to 0) ⇒ At is located in a high-density region of majority
instances.
The Percentile Rank for Minority Instances The inference from the values of
lof tM and lof
t
I in each of the above mentioned cases controls the number of arti-
ficial samples to be generated per minority instance. In lof tM , we define perclof
t
M
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as the percentile rank for each minority instance At compared to the majority in-
stances. For instance, if the lof tM for A
t is the highest compared to all the majority
instances (i.e. lof tM=1), then perclof
t
M = 100. If lof
t
M=0.7, then perclof
t
M=70;
the lof tM for A
t is greater than 70% of the majority instances. Similarly, we define
perclof tI as the percentile rank for each minority instance A
t compared to other
minority instances.
Removing Trapper Instances: The anomalous behaviours attributed to mali-
cious insiders often have a high resemblance with the normal behaviours of the in-
siders or their community (i.e. a group of users having the same role). In the feature
space, this appears as minority (anomalous) instances located in a high-density
region of majority (normal) instances. These minority instances are characterised
by a low degree of outlierness (i.e. low lof tM (close to 0)), thus a low perclof
t
M .
We define the parameter τ to be the survival threshold for the minority in-
stances, such that each minority instance At ∈ I having a perclof tM < τ is con-
sidered as a trapper instance. The high resemblance of the trapper instances with
the surrounding majority instances, would trap the classifier to detect the sur-
rounding majority instances as minority (FPs). In our AMOTRE oversampling
technique, we propose to take a precautionary step and remove these trapper in-
stances, in an attempt to reduce its contribution to flagging false alarms (FPs).
Hence, a new set of minority instances Ir will include the minority instances hav-
ing perclof tM ≥ τ ;∀At excluding the removed trapper instances as detailed in
Algorithm 1.
The idea of removing trapper instances is supported by the aim of to detect
any-behaviour-all-threats in the opportunistic approach, where it is sufficient to
detect any anomalous behaviour, not necessarily all behaviours, for each malicious
insider threat. This means that removing a minority trapper instance from the
set I is practically removing an anomalous behaviour from all the anomalous
behaviours associated to a malicious insider threat. In other words, the rest of
the anomalous behaviours associated with the malicious insider threat still exist,
which permit the detection of the threat (i.e. insider) regardless of the removed
anomalous behaviour. Therefore, removing trapper instances not only can improve
the performance of the classifier, but also is supported by our ultimate aim to
detect any-behaviour-all-threat.
Peculiarity of Remaining Minority Instances We define the peculiarity of a
minority instance At ∈ Ir using the probability pt. pt represents the probability
of generating artificial samples for At. Consider the Eq. 1:
pt =
(
dperclof tMe × dperclof tIe
)
/104 (1)
where pt is a probability devised from the product of perclof tM and perclof
t
I .
The rationale behind using the product is to utilise the degree of outlierness of
the instance At with respect to both: (1) the majority instances (perclof tM ), and
(2) the minority instances (perclof tI). In other words, p
t actually determines the
peculiarity of an instance At based on its location among the data distribution
of both majority instances and minority instances. And accordingly, pt gives the
probability of generating artificial samples for At.
3.2.2.2 Generating Artificial Samples for Minority Instances Let perc.over rep-
resent the percentage of artificial samples to be generated, and let numS =
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Algorithm 2 Generating an artificial sample St.
1: numS ← (perc.over/100)× card(Ir)
2: while card(Is) < numS do
3: Ic ∼ Dp
4: foreach At ∈ Ic do
5: St ← generateSample(At,M)
6: Is ← Is ∪ St
7: end for
8: end while
9: return Is
10:
11: function generateSample(At,M)
12: foreach atf in A
t do
13: pos nt
′
f ← positive nearest neighbour in M at the level of feature f
14: neg nt
′
f ← negative nearest neighbour in M at the level of feature f
15: dirS ∼ Dprob+
16: if ∃pos nt′f ∧ neg nt
′
f then
17: dirN ← dirS
18: if dirS = +1 then
19: distN ← dist(atf , pos nt
′
f )
20: else
21: distN ← dist(atf , neg nt
′
f )
22: end if
23: end if
24: if ∃pos nt′f then
25: distN ← dist(atf , pos nt
′
f )
26: end if
27: if ∃neg nt′f then
28: distN ← dist(atf , neg nt
′
f )
29: end if
30: stf ← atf + dirS × rand(0 : λ× distN)
31: St ← St ∪ stf
32: end for
33: return St
34: end function
(perc.over/100) × card(Ir) represent the number of artificial samples to be gen-
erated. In the following, we only consider the set of remaining minority instances
Ir, excluding the removed trapper instances, to generate the artificial samples.
As aforementioned, the peculiarity of the minority instances, which manifests in
the probability pt for each At ∈ Ir, will guide the process of sampling. The steps
described below are repeated for a number of iterations until numS of artificial
samples is generated. Algorithm 2 gives a brief formalisation for generating artifi-
cial samples for minority instances.
Identifying the Chances for Sampling Minority Instances Per Iteration A prob-
ability distribution Dp is devised using the above probabilities p
t ∀At ∈ Ir to
determine whether an artificial sample St will be generated for At at the current
iteration. We define Ic ∼ Dp where Ic represents the set of instances chosen ac-
cording to Dp to be sampled, and p is a continuous range of the values of p
t. For
instance, if pt = 1, where perclof tM = 100 and perclof
t
I = 100, this means that A
t
is an extreme outlier instance and it is safe to create a cloud of artificial samples
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(a) Over one feature (one dimension). (b) Over two features (two dimensions).
Fig. 3: Cases of generating artificial insider threat samples in AMOTRE.
around it as much as possible. However, as pt decreases, the chance of generating
artificial samples around At declines, because an extreme outlier instance attracts
more artificial samples around it. For example, if pt = 0.25, this may map to two
cases: either high lof tM (close to 1) and low lof
t
I (close to 0), then A
t is surrounded
by minority instances and we give a lower chance to generating artificial samples
around At; or low lof tM (close to 0), then A
t is surrounded by majority instances
and we should seek to generate as few as possible artificial samples around it. In
this way, the minority instances having higher peculiarity pt are given more chance
to generate artificial samples surrounding them.
Artificial Sampling At Feature Level Let nt
′
f represent the value of the f
th
feature of a majority instance N t
′ ∈M at the session slot t′, and let atf represent
the value of the f th feature of a minority instance At ∈ Ic at the session slot t.
For each feature f ; 1  f  m, we calculate the distance from atf of At to the
nearest neighbour nt
′
f of N
t′ at the level of feature f . In other words, we search the
set of majority instances M at the level of feature f only, and we find the closest
feature nt
′
f for a
t
f . At the level of feature f , there exists two directions: positive
(+ve), and negative (−ve). Thus, atf may have (1) only a +ve nearest neighbour,
(2) only a −ve nearest neighbour, or (3) both a +ve nearest neighbour and a
−ve neatest neighbour. For instance, if atf is greater than nt
′
f , then the nearest
neighbour’s distance distN=dist(atf , n
t′
f ) will be positive. On the other hand, if
atf is less than n
t′
f , then distN will be negative. The value(s) of distN for a
t
f is
required to generate artificial feature values as demonstrated in Equation 2.
We define prob+ as the probability of generating an artificial sample in the
positive (+ve) direction. A probability distribution Dprob+ is devised using the
probability prob+ to determine whether the direction dirS of the artificial feature
value stf is +1 or −1. We define dirS ∼ Dprob+ , where prob+ is a continuous range
of the values of prob+. Figure 3a illustrates generating an artificial feature value stf
for atf at the level of feature f . Let a blue circle represent a majority feature value
(i.e. feature value nt
′
f of a majority instance), a red square represent a minority
feature value (i.e. feature value atf of a minority instance), and a red dashed square
represent an artificial feature value (i.e. feature value stf of an artificial instance)
An Opportunistic Knowledge Discovery Approach to Insider Threat Detection 13
generated. In the following, we describe the three cases for generating an artificial
feature value:
– If atf has only a +ve nearest neighbour n
t′
f as Figure 3a(1), then the proba-
bility of generating an artificial feature value stf in the +ve direction is lower.
We set up prob+ = 0.2. The rationale behind this is to give higher chance for
generating artificial feature values on the opposite direction of the +ve near-
est neighbour (i.e. −ve direction), thus creating a cloud of artificial minority
instances away from the nearest majority instances. If the chosen direction
dirS = +1 based on Dprob+ , then s
t
f is calculated according to Eq. 2 such that
λ = 0.3. Otherwise, λ = 1.
– If atf has only a −ve nearest neighbour nt
′
f as Figure 3a(3), then the probabil-
ity of generating an artificial feature value stf in the +ve direction is higher.
We set up prob+ = 0.8. The rationale behind this is to give higher chance
for generating artificial feature values on the opposite direction of the −ve
nearest neighbour (i.e. +ve direction), thus creating a cloud of artificial minor-
ity instances away from the nearest majority instances. If the chosen direction
dirS = +1, then stf is calculated according to Eq. 2 such that λ = 1. Otherwise,
λ = 0.3.
– If atf has two nearest neighbours in both directions, as in Figure 3a(2), then
the probability of generating an artificial feature value stf in the +ve and −ve
direction is equal. We set up prob+ = 0.5. This means both directions have
equal chance of generating an artificial feature value. If the chosen direction
dirS = +1 or dirS = −1, stf is calculated according to Eq. 2 such that λ = 0.3.
stf = a
t
f + dirS × rand(0 : λ× distN); stf ≥ 0 (2)
where λ represents the parameter that controls the distance permitted to gener-
ate artificial feature values along the segment joining atf and n
t′
f ; and rand(0 :
λ × distN) represents a random number generated to specify the location of the
artificial sample along the segment joining atf and n
t′
f projected on the feature f .
λ is set up to the value of 0.3, when the direction chosen to generate an artificial
feature value is the same as the direction of the nearest neighbour. The rationale
behind this is to locate the artificial feature values on the segment joining atf and
nt
′
f away from the majority nearest neighbour n
t′
f , thus shielding the majority
instances. Otherwise, λ = 1, such that an artificial feature value can be located
along the whole segment.
Recall that all the artificial feature values in the generated community be-
haviour data sets are normalised to the range [0, 1]. Hence, if the calculated stf < 0,
we assign stf = minf to avoid negative feature values. minf represents the mini-
mum value of the f th feature among the minority instances.
Artificial Sampling At Instance Level Recall that if a minority instance At is
given the chance to be sampled at an iteration (based on its peculiarity), then an
artificial sample (instance) St is generated with a sampling process at the feature
level. In other words, for each feature f ; 1  f  m, an artificial feature value stf
is generated. Accordingly, an artificial sample (instance) St={st1, st2, ..., stf} asso-
ciated with the minority instance At is generated.
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As previously mentioned, the steps of Section 3.2.2 are repeated for a number
of iterations until numS of artificial samples are generated. Recall that Ir rep-
resents the set of remaining minority instances after removing trapper instances.
Let Is represent the set of artificial samples (instances) generated for Ir using
the AMOTRE technique. At each iteration, the generated St is appended to Is
(Is=Is∪St as formalised in Algorithm 2). Consequently, the original set of minor-
ity instances I is updated to I=Ir ∪ Is to comprise the set of remaining minority
instances Ir (excluding trapper instances) and their generated minority samples
Is.
Figure 3b demonstrates the idea of generating artificial samples over two fea-
tures (two dimensions). Let a blue circle represent a majority instance N t
′
, a red
square represent a minority instance At, and a red dashed square represent an ar-
tificial sample (instance) St. It is evident that the farther the minority instance At
from the majority instances as well as other minority instances, the more chance is
given to generate artificial samples around it. Furthermore, the artificial samples
are mostly generated in the opposite direction of the nearest neighbours from the
majority instances, thus shielding the border of the majority instances.
3.3 Class Decomposition Component
As described previously, the availability of data of both ‘normal’ class and ‘anoma-
lous class’ shapes the insider threat problem as a supervised classification problem.
However, the challenge here lies in the data with class imbalance, where the nor-
mal instances dominate the minor number of anomalous instances (i.e. malicious
insider threats). The performance of a classification method typically tends to
decline when the data distributes in an imbalanced way.
Previous work in addressing class imbalance has considered weakening the
effect of the majority class by undersampling its instances [6,27,40] – a process
that leads to loss of information, and the possibility of degradation of classification
performance as a consequence. Other previous work [26,25] has considered the idea
of clustering to guide the sampling process (referred to as cluster-based sampling).
The latter tackles the within-class imbalance and further clusters the minority
class before oversampling. However, this process can be ineffective in the insider
threat problem due to the scarcity and sparsity of the anomalous behaviours.
Vilalta et al. [38] proposed the idea of class decomposition to address the
problem of high bias and low variance in the classification methods. The idea of
class decomposition tackles the class that distributes in a complex way and applies
clustering to this class to decompose it into multiple clusters, thus identifying
local patterns within the class. The data of the original class label is assigned the
corresponding cluster label as a preprocessing step for the classification method.
In this way, the classifier learns multiple decision boundaries (per cluster), rather
than a single decision boundary with respect to the original class, and thus avoids
data overfitting.
In this work, we adopt class decomposition to address the problem of class
imbalance data. Although class decomposition was originally proposed to reduce
high bias in classifiers [38], it has the property of weakening the effect of the
decomposed class when constructing the classification model. Such a property is
useful if class decomposition is applied to the majority class to address the class
imbalance problem. The idea is to decompose the majority class into clusters (i.e.
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subclasses) to weaken the effect of the majority class with respect to the minority
class.
There is a considerable body of literature that has successfully applied k-means
clustering for class decomposition and/or class imbalance data [3,10,25,26,39]. In
the class decomposition component, We select k-means clustering [23] to decom-
pose the class into k clusters (subclasses). k-means clustering is known to be fast,
robust, and less computationally demanding. It only requires tuning the parameter
k which controls the number of clusters. Favourably, it does not require, and there-
fore is not influenced by, data-dependent parameters. In this way, the two-class
classification problem (‘normal’ class label versus ‘anomalous’ class label) is trans-
formed into a multi-class classification problem (labels of clusters (sub-classes) of
‘normal’ class versus ‘anomalous’ class).
Hence, class decomposition allows the classification method to delineate mul-
tiple decision boundaries instead of one decision boundary and to achieve better
separation between the majority subclasses and the minority class, thus improving
the prediction of new instances.
3.3.1 Decomposing the Majority Class
As described above, we adopt the idea of class decomposition in the insider threat
problem to mitigate the bias towards the majority (normal) class in the classifica-
tion. We apply k-means clustering method to decompose the majority class into
k clusters (subclasses).
Let Xt = {xt1, xt2, ..., xtm} represent the feature vector at session slot t, where
xtf ; 1  f  m represents the value of the f th feature. Let Y = {y1, y2} represent
the output space, where y1 is the majority class label and y2 is the minority class
label. Each instance (i.e. feature vector) Xt belongs to a class label yj , j = {1, 2}.
Let M = Xt ∀t;Xt ∈ y1 represent the set of instances that belong to the
majority class y1, and let I represent the set of instances that belong to the
minority class y2. If we apply k-means clustering method on the set M , then the
class label y1 will break down into k cluster labels. Hence, each instance Xt in the
set M will be assigned a cluster label instead of a class label. Let {yc11, yc12, ..., yc1k}
represent the set of cluster labels belonging to class label y1, where yc1k; 1  c  k
represents the cth cluster label.
Figure 4 illustrates the idea of applying class decomposition on the major-
ity class. Let the blue circles represent the majority instances (i.e. normal be-
haviours), and let the red squares represent the minority instances (i.e. anomalous
behaviours). The green dashed circles represent the k=3 clusters (patterns) iden-
tified among the majority data. In this case, the problem is defined as a multi-
class (four-class) classification problem, where the output space is represented as
Y = {yc11, yc12, yc13, y2}, such that Y C = {yc11, yc12, yc13} denotes the cluster labels,
and y2 denotes the minority class label.
3.3.2 Decomposing the Minority Class
As previously mentioned, we proposed an oversampling technique to tackle the
minority class. As later explained in the experiments, the concept of class decom-
position may be also applied to the minority class, however, after oversampling its
instances. The original size of the minority class is very small, where the number
of minority instances (e.g. 132 anomalous behaviours in com-I) is much lower than
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Fig. 4: Decomposition of the majority class into k=3 clusters.
the number of majority instances (e.g. 2964 normal behaviours in com-I) – we
refer to this as ‘scarcity’. Also, the distribution of minority instances is dispersed,
where the minority instances may exist among the majority behaviours or may
be dispersed among the whole data – we refer to this as ‘sparsity’. The scarcity
and sparsity of the minority instances in the insider threat data sets makes it dif-
ficult to cluster the original minority class I. If we oversample the set I, then the
updated set I will append the artificial set Is. Eventually, the updated set I can
then be decomposed into k clusters.
Consider I = Xt ∀t;Xt ∈ y2, the set of instances that belong to the minority
class y2. If we apply k-means clustering method on the set I, then the class label
y2 will break down into k cluster labels. Hence, each instance Xt in the set I will
be assigned a cluster label instead of a class label. Let {yc21, yc22, ..., yc2k} represent
the set of cluster labels belonging to class label y2, where yc2k; 1  c  k represents
the cth cluster label.
3.4 Classification Component
Typically, the knowledge discovery system consists of the feature engineering com-
ponent and the classification component. But, given the challenge of insider threat
problem and the problem of class imbalance, we proposed an opportunistic knowl-
edge discovery system AnyThreat with an extension of two components: an over-
sampling component, and a class decomposition component.
Typically, the classification component applies a classification method to delin-
eate a decision boundary between the majority class and the minority class – two-
class classification. In the proposed AnyThreat system, the classification method is
applied on the subclasses (i.e. clusters) produced by the class decomposition com-
ponent. Thus, it delineates multiple decision boundaries instead of one boundary
to achieve better separation between the majority class(es) (i.e. sublclasses) and
the minority class(es) – multi-class classification. Hence, it improves the prediction
of the new instances.
4 Experiments
In this section, we give a description of the variety of experiments carried out to
evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, together with an explanation
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of the values used for parameter tuning. After that, we introduce the default
versions and the refined versions of the evaluation measures utilised to evaluate
the performance of the methods. Last but not least, we discuss the results of the
experiments with a statistical significance test, and prove the merit of the proposed
opportunistic AnyThreat system.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we performed a
variety of experiments on the CMU-CERT data sets on Windows Server 2016 on
Microsoft Azure (RAM 140GB, OS 64−bits, CPU Intel Xeon E5−2673v3). First,
MATLAB R2016b was used to preprocess the data set and generate community
data sets per session slots of 4 hours. We implemented AMOTRE and carried out
the experiments in R environment (R − 3.4.1) using Rlof package for LOF in
AMOTRE, DMwR package for SMOTE, caret package [28] for the classification
methods and their evaluation, and MASS package for the Wilcoxon Ranked test.
4.2 Description of the Experiments
Table 1 presents the variety of experiments carried out to evaluate the effective-
ness of the extended components (oversampling component + class decomposition
component) on the performance of the proposed opportunistic AnyThreat system.
Default represents a base model that only applies one of the classification meth-
ods. SMOTE represents a base model that employs SMOTE in the oversampling
component and drops the class decomposition component. Similarly, AMOTRE
represents a base model that employs the proposed AMOTRE in the oversam-
pling component and drops the class decomposition component. AMO-na repre-
sents an experiment that employs AMOTRE without the trapper removal (-TRE)
method – AMO- oversampling. CD(M)-SMOTE and CD(M)-AMOTRE represent
experiments that employ SMOTE and AMOTRE respectively in the oversam-
pling component and apply Class Decomposition (CD) on the majority class M
only. CD(MI)-SMOTE and CD(MI)-AMOTRE represent experiments that em-
ploy SMOTE and AMOTRE respectively in the oversampling component and
apply class decomposition on the majority class M and on the minority class I.
These experiments are evaluated using the measures defined later: TPT , FP, and
F1 measure. Note that the procedure of trapper removal is not applied with
SMOTE, because it was first introduced as an essential part (-TRE part) in the
proposed AMO-TRE technique for the oversampling component. In the experi-
ments, we analyse the influence of the -TRE part on our technique by applying
the oversampling: (1) without trapper removal (AMO-na), and (2) with trapper
removal (AMO-TRE), as revealed in Table 1. We then analyse the influence of
introducing class decomposition variations to each of SMOTE and AMOTRE.
Each of the experiments is evaluated on five base classification methods utilised
in the classification component: Random Forest (rf); Extreme Gradient Boost-
ing (xgb); Support Vector Machines with linear kernel (svmL), polynomial kernel
(svmP), and radial basis function kernel (svmR).
The experiments are tuned for different values of parameters as shown in
Table 2. Note that an extensive number of experiments was done to select the
presented tuning values for the parameters. The values were selected based on the
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Table 1: Definition of Experiments.
Default base classification method
SMOTE SMOTE minority class I
CD(M)-SMOTE SMOTE + CD of majority class M only
CD(MI)-SMOTE SMOTE + CD of M and I
AMO-na AMOTRE I without trapper removal
AMOTRE AMOTRE I with trapper removal
CD(M)-AMOTRE AMOTRE + CD of M only
CD(MI)-AMOTRE AMOTRE + CD of M and I
Table 2: Tuned Parameters for SMOTE and AMOTRE.
k={2, 4, 6} number of clusters
perc.over={200, 300, 400} percentage of oversampling
τ=10 survival threshold for At in -TRE part
prob+={0.2, 0.5, 0.8} controlled by the direction of nt′f
λ={0.3, 1} controlled by dirS and prob+
experiments achieving the best performance in terms of the evaluation measures
described below.
Regarding class decomposition, we tuned the number of clusters for k={2, 4, 6}
for both (1) the decomposition of the majority class M , and (2) the decomposition
of the minority class I. However, the results for only k=2 are reported, due to
revealing better performance. The proposed approach was able to detect most of
the malicious insider threats in the data sets for k=2. The literature demonstrated
the effectiveness of k-means clustering for small values of k when applied for class
decomposition [3,26].
As explained in Section 3.2, a malicious insider threat comprises a set of anoma-
lous behaviours (instances) carried out by a malicious insider. For instance, in
community com-P, we have 17 malicious insider threats. These malicious insider
threats are associated to 366 anomalous instances (behaviours) that make up the
minority class I. Thus, when applying the class decomposition of the minority
class I, we are actually clustering the anomalous training instances from the 366
instances; not from the 17 malicious insider threats.
Regarding SMOTE technique, the oversampling percentage is tuned for perc.over
={200, 300, 400} to assess whether increasing the percentage of generated artificial
samples to the minority class I improves the performance of SMOTE. Similarly,
our AMOTRE technique is tuned for perc.over={200, 300, 400} to generate an
equal number of artificial samples to that generated in SMOTE. Note that we
report the results for only perc.over=200, due to achieving the lowest number of
false positives (FP); which is the ultimate aim of our work.
The -TRE part is tuned for only τ=10 to test the influence of removing trap-
per instances from the minority class instances on the overall performance of
AMOTRE. We select the survival threshold τ=10 so that each minority instance
At ∈ I having a percentile rank perclof tM < τ is considered as a trapper instance
and removed (as detailed in Section 3).
The details about tuning prob+ and λ, for the displayed values in Table 2, can
be found in the description of AMOTRE technique in Section 3.
Based on the challenge of the insider threat problem, a 2-fold cross validation
is applied so that the base classification methods learn on a 50% subsample of
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the data, and test on a 50% subsample repetitively for 2 times. This allows the
50% subsample testing data to have more instances, including more anomalous in-
stances (behaviours). Hence, it helps us to reveal the performance of the proposed
opportunistic AnyThreat system. In 2-fold cross validation, each fold may contain
a subset of the anomalous behaviours belonging to a malicious insider threat. In
terms of the training, this provides ‘weak supervision’, as some of the anomalous
behaviours associated to a particular threat will be missing in the training fold. In
terms of the testing, this would show the ‘robustness’ of the approach being able
to detect the malicious insider threat whose behaviours are partially represented
in the training fold, even with a weak signal (threats are partially represented in
the test fold).
4.3 Evaluation Measures
Much research has been done to detect or mitigate malicious insider threats, but
standard measures have not been established to evaluate the proposed models
[20]. The research practices show that the insider threat problem demands the
measurement of the effectiveness of the models before being deployed, preferably
in terms of true positives (TP) and false positives (FP) [21].
The variety of the utilised evaluation measures in the state-of-the-art reveals
the critical need to formulate the insider threat problem and to define the mea-
sures that would best validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. In the
following, we define the evaluation measures utilised in this article.
As previously mentioned, the ultimate aim of this approach is to detect any-
behaviour-all-threats (opportunistic approach as described in Section 1), and to
reduce the number of false alarms. In the following, we define the measures used
to evaluate the performance. We introduced refined versions of some measures.
The rationale behind this is related to our ultimate aim, which is to detect the
malicious insider threats (not necessarily all anomalous behaviours per threat), and
at the same time to reduce FPs (all false alarms of false predicted behaviours).
– P: Positives number of anomalous instances (anomalous behaviours);
– PT : Threats number of malicious insider threats associated to anomalous in-
stances. In other words, PT is the number of malicious insiders attributed to
the anomalous behaviours;
– TPT : True Positives a refined version of the default TP to evaluate the number
of threats detected by the system among all the PT malicious insider threats.
TPT is incremented if at least one anomalous instance (behaviour associated
to the threat) is predicted as anomalous;
– FP: False Positives number of normal instances (behaviours) that are detected
as anomalous instances;
– TN: True Negatives number of normal instances (behaviours) that are pre-
dicted as normal;
– FNT : False Negatives a refined version of the default FN to evaluate the number
of insider threats not detected; and
– F1 measure: defined based on the values of the above defined measures. Note
that F1 is not close to 1 due to the use of refined versions of some measures,
but this does not reflect low performance. That is because the maximum TPT
(evaluated per threat) is much lower than the minimum FP (evaluated per
behaviour).
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4.4 Results and Discussion
In this Section, we discuss the results of the variety of experiments carried out,
and show the merit of the proposed AnyThreat system according to the following
objectives:
1. assessing the performance of the AnyThreat system in terms of TPT and FP
measures;
2. assessing the influence of trapper removal on the proposed AMOTRE in the
oversampling component in terms of F1 measure; and
3. assessing the effectiveness of introducing the class decomposition component
for the majority class and the minority class.
4.4.1 Assessment of AnyThreat in terms of TPT and FP Measures.
The following will address the TPT and FP measures, which represent key mea-
sures for the insider threat problem.
Table 3 reports the maximum TPT in each of the experiments over the com-
munities, associated with the base classifier(s) which achieved the maximum TPT .
Over com-P, Table 3 shows that the Default detects only TPT=11/16, missing
5 malicious insider threats. Note that 11/16 represents the number of detected
threats TPT=11 out of the number of threats PT=16. On the other hand, CD(M)-
SMOTE and CD(M)-AMOTRE achieve the maximum TPT=14/16, where only 2
malicious insider threats are not detected.
Over com-S, the Default detects TPT=17/21, missing 4 malicious insider threats.
CD(MI)-SMOTE, AMOTRE and CD(MI)-AMOTRE attain the maximum TPT ,
where CD(MI)-SMOTE detects TPT=17/20; while AMOTRE and CD(MI)-AMOTRE
detect TPT=18/21. Only 3 malicious insider threats are missed.
Over com-I, the Default detects TPT=7/11, missing 4 malicious insider threats.
SMOTE attains the maximum TPT=9/12, where only 3 malicious insider threats
are missed.
It is evident that the Default failed to detect as much malicious insider threat
as the other experiments of the proposed AnyThreat system over all the commu-
nities. The maximum TPT is achieved by the variations of class decomposition
experiments with AMOTRE and SMOTE over the communities, excluding com-I
where SMOTE of the oversampling component achieved the maximum TPT . Re-
call that the ultimate aim in the insider threat problem is to detect all malicious
insider threats. Hence, the our AnyThreat system with the proposed components
demonstrate better performance in terms of TPT measure.
To test the significance of the results, we use the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
which compares each pair of experiments. The Default base classifiers are compared
to the proposed AnyThreat system in terms of the TPT measure, as the ultimate
aim of the opportunistic approach is to detect all malicious insider threats. The p-
value for 〈Default, AnyThreat〉 is 0.001069 < .05. Hence, the proposed AnyThreat
system is significantly different from Default base classifiers at .05 significance
level.
In Table 4, we report the minimum FP measure in each experiment over the
communities associated with the base classifier(s) which achieved the minimum
FP.
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Table 3: Maximum TPT /PT of detected insider threats over communities associated with the base
classifier(s) which achieved the maximum TPT .
Experiment com-P com-S com-I
Default 11/16 {rf,xgb} 17/21 {rf,xgb} 7/11 rf
SMOTE 13/16 {xgb,svmL} 17/21 svmR 9/12 xgb
CD(M)-SMOTE 14/16 svmR 17/22 {xgb,svmL} 8/12 {rf,xgb}
CD(MI)-SMOTE 13/16 svmL 17/20 {xgb,svmP} 8/12 rf
AMOTRE 13/16 {svmL,svmP} 18/21 svmL 8/12 {svmP,svmR}
CD(M)-AMOTRE 14/16 {svmL,svmR} 17/22 ∀\ svmR 8/12 rf
CD(MI)-AMOTRE 13/16 {svmL,svmP} 18/21 {rf,xgb,svmL} 8/12 {rf,svmL}
∀ | for all base classifiers
∀\xxxx | for all base classifiers except xxxx
svm- | for all utilised SVM methods
Table 4: Minimum FP over communities associated with the base classifier(s) which achieved the
minimum FP.
Experiment com-P com-S com-I
base classifier 0 {svmL,svmR} 20 svmR 0 {svmL,svmR}
SMOTE 69 xgb 117 xgb 5 svmR
CD(M)-SMOTE 80 xgb 123 rf 4 svmR
CD(MI)-SMOTE 80 rf 118 rf 0 svmP
AMOTRE 49 xgb 88 xgb 3 svmR
CD(M)-AMOTRE 47 rf,xgb 101 xgb 3 svmR
CD(MI)-AMOTRE 46 rf 88 xgb 6 svmR
Over com-P, Table 4 CD(MI)-AMOTRE reduces the number of FPs to the
minimum FP=46 (3.36%). Over com-S, AMOTRE and CD(MI)-AMOTRE attain
the minimum FP=88. Over com-I, CD(MI)-SMOTE attains the minimum FP=0;
svmP, compared to a minimum FP=3 for AMOTRE and CD(M)-AMOTRE.
On the other hand, the results show that the Default attains FP=0 over com-P
and com-I, however, the Default which attained FP=0 actually did not detect any
malicious insider threat (TPT=0). Similarly, the Default which attained FP=20
over com-S detected only TPT=6/21 malicious insider threat; missing 15 malicious
insider threats.
Given our ultimate aim to detect all malicious insider threats, the Default
base classifier(s) fail to prove the best performance in terms of the FP measure.
Hence, the proposed variations of class decomposition experiments with AMOTRE
and SMOTE achieve the minimum number of FP over all the communities, while
detecting most of the malicious insider threats.
In conclusion, the integration of proposed oversampling component (SMOTE
or AMOTRE) and the class decomposition component (the variations of class de-
composition) demonstrate the best performance in terms of TPT and FP measures
compared to the Default base classifiers (objective (1)). Hence, this emphasises the
importance of integrating the proposed components in the proposed AnyThreat
system.
4.4.2 Influence of Trapper Removal on the Proposed AMOTRE in the
Oversampling Component
The proposed technique AMOTRE consists of two key parts: the oversampling
part (AMO-), and the trapper removal part (-TRE). In the following, we assess
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the influence of the -TRE part on the AMOTRE technique. Table 5 provides the
values of F1 measure for AMO-na (AMO- without trapper removal) and AMOTRE
(AMO-TRE with trapper removal) on the minority class I .
Over com-P, AMOTRE reports a higher F1 measure than AMO-na for all clas-
sifiers except svmP and svmR. AMOTRE attains the maximum F1=0.2894;xgb
compared to a maximum F1=0.2637;xgb for AMO-na. Over com-S, AMOTRE
also reports a higher F1 than AMO-na for all classifiers except xgb. AMOTRE
attains a maximum F1=0.2517;xgb compared to the maximum F1=0.2556;xgb for
AMO-na. Over com-I, AMOTRE reports a higher F1 than AMO-na for all classi-
fiers. AMOTRE attains the maximum F1=0.6956;svmR compared to a maximum
F1=0.5714;svmR for AMO-na. Note that AMO-na shows equal performance to
AMOTRE in terms of F1 with respect to {svmL,svmP}.
We can conclude that removing trapper instances from the minority class I
boosts the performance of the base classifier in terms of F1 measure (objective
(2)). These trapper instances, if not removed, would be selected in the AMOTRE
iterations to generate artificial samples around them. This would trap the classifier
from finding the optimal decision boundary that separates majority instances from
minority instances, which in turn results in a high number of false alarms. However,
removing trapper instances is a precautionary step towards reducing the number
of FPs, and achieving a higher F1 measure.
4.4.3 Effectiveness of Introducing the Class Decomposition Component
Here, we assess the effectiveness of class decomposition component on the proposed
AnyThreat system. Table 5 provides the values of F1 measure for the variations
of class decomposition experiments compared to the base models of SMOTE and
AMOTRE over the communities in 2-fold cross validation. The results are reported
with respect to the five base classifiers.
Class decomposition is applied in two different strategies: to the majority class
M only as in CD(M)-SMOTE and CD(M)-AMOTRE; and to the majority class M
as well as to the minority class I as in CD(MI)-SMOTE and CD(MI)-AMOTRE.
Over com-P, CD(M)-AMOTRE outperforms AMOTRE base model in terms
of F1 with respect to all base classifiers. CD(M)-SMOTE outperforms SMOTE
base model with respect to r{rf,svmR}. Overall, CD(M)-AMOTRE attains the
maximum F1=0.32;{rf,xgb} compare to all other experiments. With respect to
the Default, CD(M)-AMOTRE outperforms all base classifiers except svmP which
achieved better F1 measure, however, TPT=5/16;svmP only in this case.
Over com-S, CD(MI)-AMOTRE outperforms AMOTRE base model in terms
of F1 with respect to all base classifiers. CD(MI)-SMOTE outperforms SMOTE
base model with respect to all base classifiers except svmL. Overall, CD(MI)-
AMOTRE attains the maximum F1=0.2834;rf compared to all other experiments.
With respect to the Default, CD(MI)-AMOTRE outperforms rf and xgb base clas-
sifiers, while Default achieves better F1 measure in with respect svm-. Similarly, in
the case Default achieves better F1 measure, the maximum of TPT=11/21;svmL
only was achieved; missing 10 malicious insider threats.
Over com-I, CD(MI)-AMOTRE outperforms AMOTRE base mode with re-
spect to {xgb,svmL}. CD(MI)-SMOTE outperforms SMOTE base model with
respect to all base classifiers except xgb. Overall, AMOTRE attains the max-
imum F1=0.6956;svmR followed with a maximum F1=0.6363;svmR for CD(M)-
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Table 5: Comparing the values of F1 measure for each of the defined experiments over the commu-
nities in 2-fold cross validation. The results are reported with respect to the five base classifiers {rf,
xgb, svmL, svmP, svmR}. The values of F1 measure is associated with the TPT achieved for the
Default base classifiers.
Experiment rf xgb svmL svmP svmR
base classifier 0.3013 (11/16) 0.2558 (11/16) / (0/16) 0.3703 (5/16) / (0/16)
SMOTE 0.2142 0.2653 0.1452 0.1256 0.1454
AMOTRE 0.2558 0.2894 0.1699 0.1969 0.1860
AMO-na 0.2222 0.2637 0.1677 0.2295 0.1925
CD(M)-SMOTE 0.2222 0.2056 0.1313 0.1165 0.1590
CD(M)-AMOTRE 0.32 0.32 0.2089 0.2166 0.2121
CD(MI)-SMOTE 0.2056 0.2037 0.1405 0.1297 0.1549
CD(MI)-AMOTRE 0.2777 0.2597 0.2407 0.2280 0.1739
(a) com-P.
Experiment rf xgb svmL svmP svmR
base classifier 0.2677 (17/21) 0.2615 (17/21) 0.3013 (11/21) 0.2647 (9/21) 0.2553 (6/21)
SMOTE 0.1886 0.2077 0.2073 0.1797 0.2
AMOTRE 0.2463 0.24 0.2517 0.2344 0.2191
AMO-na 0.2207 0.2556 0.2312 0.2193 0.2111
CD(M)-SMOTE 0.1987 0.2085 0.1827 0.1711 0.1860
CD(M)-AMOTRE 0.2236 0.2428 0.2207 0.2312 0.2176
CD(MI)-SMOTE 0.2179 0.2142 0.2 0.1910 0.2073
CD(MI)-AMOTRE 0.2834 0.2686 0.2368 0.2377 0.2411
(b) com-S.
Experiment rf xgb svmL svmP svmR
base classifier 0.6363 (7/11) 0.2666 (4/11) / (0/11) 0.2857 (2/11) / (0/11)
SMOTE 0.4444 0.4 0.5 0.5925 0.5833
AMOTRE 0.6086 0.4285 0.4516 0.5 0.6956
AMO-na 0.5384 0.3809 0.4516 0.5 0.5714
CD(M)-SMOTE 0.3902 0.3636 0.4615 0.4615 0.5454
CD(M)-AMOTRE 0.5714 0.3636 0.4516 0.461 0.6363
CD(MI)-SMOTE 0.4848 0.3333 0.5555 0.625 0.6315
CD(MI)-AMOTRE 0.5714 0.4666 0.5 0.48 0.56
(c) com-I.
AMOTRE compared to all other experiments. With respect to the Default, CD(MI)-
AMOTRE outperforms all base classifiers except rf which achieved better F1 mea-
sure, however, TPT=7/11;rf only in this case.
It is evident that the Default base classifiers fail to prove the best performance
in terms of the F1 measure given that it did failed to detect as much malicious
insider threats as the other experiments of the proposed AnyThreat system over
all the communities (ultimate aim of detecting all threats). Hence, introducing
class decomposition along to the oversampling technique (as in CD(M)-SMOTE
or CD(MI)-SMOTE and CD(M)-AMOTRE or CD(MI)-AMOTRE) improved the
performance of AMOTRE base model and SMOTE base model in terms of F1
measure over all base classifiers, as well as it improved the performance of the
Default base classifier(s) in terms of F1 measure and particularly TPT .
Accordingly, we can deduce the effectiveness of introducing the class decom-
position component to the AnyThreat system (objective (3)).
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this article, we address the insider threat problem as a knowledge discovery
problem with class imbalance with the aim of detecting all malicious insider threats
while reducing the number of false alarms. We propose an opportunistic knowledge
discovery system, namely AnyThreat, with the aim to detect any-behaviour-all-
threats; we can hunt a malicious insider threat by at least detecting one anoma-
lous behaviour associated to this threat. This will contribute in reducing the false
alarms. The AnyThreat system consists of four components: a feature engineering
component, an oversampling component, a class decomposition component, and a
classification component. We define AMOTRE as a selective oversampling tech-
nique for the oversampling component, where it selects the minority instances to
be oversampled based on a measured local outlier factor. The minority instances
located in a high-density region of majority instances are trapper instances that
would trap the classification method. In AMOTRE, trapper instances are removed
to reduce the number of false alarms. The role of the class decomposition com-
ponent is to weaken the majority class by decomposing it into subclasses, so the
decision of the classifier would not bias toward the majority class. Class decom-
position can also be applied to the minority class after oversampling in order to
achieve balance between the subclasses.
We evaluate different variations of applying the state-of-the-art sampling tech-
nique SMOTE or the proposed selective oversampling technique AMOTRE in the
oversampling component with and without integrating the class decomposition
component with respect to five high performing base classification methods. The
experiments showed that the trapper removal is a key part of AMO-TRE oversam-
pling technique, where AMOTRE reveals higher F1 measure compared to AMO-na
with respect to the base classifiers over all communities. Moreover, introducing the
variations of class decomposition improved the performance of the base classifiers,
thus emphasising the effectiveness of the class decomposition component. The re-
sults show the merit of the proposed opportunistic knowledge discovery system
AnyThreat in terms of achieving the maximum number of detected threats TPT ,
while reducing the number of FPs compared to the SMOTE abd AMOTRE base
models, as well as to the Default base classifiers.
Several directions on utilising alternative methods in the proposed AnyThreat
system are open. Future work includes optimising the hyperparameters of the clas-
sification methods through metaheuristics methods, such as Genetic Algorithm
(GA) for example, which can lead to a higher precision and recall. Also, one
can test the proposed AnyThreat system with an alternative renowned oversam-
pling technique other than SMOTE and AMOTRE for the oversampling compo-
nent. Furthermore, one can adopt the proposed concept of trapper removal (-TRE
part) in conjunction with a renowned oversampling technique. This would show
some empirical evidence of successful hybridisation (e.g. SMOTE-TRE, which is
a hybridisation of the -TRE part and the state-of-the-art SMOTE). For the class
decomposition component, we can utilise an alternative clustering method for k-
means clustering. For instance, Nickerson et al. [33] utilised Principal Direction
Divisive Partitioning (PDDP) to guide the resampling in imbalanced data sets.
PDDP [7] determines the internal structure of a class and has a linear complexity
of running time.
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